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TURNING THE LIGHTS ON
I. INTRODUCTION
 Public authorities1 have a controversial history in New York State.2 Responsible 
for the creation and maintenance of the state’s most important infrastructure, 
including bridges and housing, public authorities have often been criticized for a lack 
of transparency, accountability, and improper governance.3 In 2005, the New York 
State Assembly passed the Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005 (the 
“Public Authority Accountability Act”).4 The legislation sought to remedy the 
“shadow-like” activity of state authorities by creating an independent watchdog 
agency, instituting mandatory reporting requirements and limiting expenditures.5 
However, subsequent to its enactment, after several high-profile cases of public 
authority misconduct, it became clear that the Public Authority Accountability Act 
was not meeting its objectives.6 According to the 2010 annual report by the 
Authorities Budget office, “the law lacked basic enforcement language that could 
ensure compliance, improve board member performance, and strengthen the 
oversight role of the [Authorities Budget Office].”7 In response to this criticism, 
members of the New York State Legislature recommended that additional changes 
be implemented to the statute.8 In 2009, Governor David Paterson signed the Public 
Authorities Reform Act of 2009 (the “Reform Act”), which amended the Public 
Authority Accountability Act.9
1. “Public authorities are agencies that governors and legislatures establish outside the main structure of 
government to escape the restrictions that elected leaders and the people place on ‘regular’ state 
agencies.” Robert B. Ward, New York State Government: What it Does, How it Works 300 
(2002); Black’s Law Dictionary 152 (9th ed. 2009) (defining public authorities).
2. Ward, supra note 1, at 284.
3. See Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public Authority Reform: Where We Have Come 
From and Where We Need to Go, 11 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Gov’t L. & Pol’y J., 1, 15 (2009) [hereinafter 
Wilson Memo].
4. 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1789 (codified as amended at N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2–4002 (McKinney 2011)); 
Press Release, N.Y. State Authority Budget Office, Governor Signs Public Authorities Accountability Act 
(Jan. 16, 2006) available at, http://www.abo.state.ny.us/archives/PressReleaseforChapter766%20_S5927.
pdf; Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Office, David Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Public Authorities 
Reform into Law (Dec. 11 2008), available at http://www.weil.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=38465.
5. See Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 19–20.
6. See Stephen Ceasar, A Magnifying Glass on Public Authorities, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (July 12, 
2010, 12:37 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/putting-a-magnifiying-glass-to-
public-authorities.
7. N.Y. State Auths. Budget Office, Annual Report on Public Authorities in New York State (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 ABO Report], www.abo.state.ny.us/reports/annualreports/ABO2010AnnualReport.pdf.
8. Sponsor’s Memorandum, 2009 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. A.B. 2209 (McKinney).
9. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1349–1384 (codified at N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2–3957 (McKinney 2011)); 
Press Release, supra note 4.
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 Notably, the amended law codified the fiduciary duties of authority board 
members in the hope of achieving model governance.10 In the three years since the 
law was enacted, no New York state court has had the opportunity to review the 
fiduciary duty provisions of the Reform Act. Thus, it remains to be seen how these 
duties can be judicially enforced.
 This note will examine the fiduciary provisions of the Reform Act and evaluate, 
specifically, whether the new obligation to act “in the best interest of the authority . . . 
and the public interest”11 will play a meaningful role in influencing board member 
decisionmaking and deterring misconduct. In assessing the effectiveness of the 
fiduciary duty provisions, this note will examine when the duties will be implicated, 
how they will be enforced, and, most importantly, the consequences of noncompliance. 
After addressing these questions, this note argues that the fiduciary duty provisions 
enacted under the Reform Act fall short of achieving the act’s purpose, which is to 
eradicate the self-dealing and irresponsible decisionmaking that have too often 
characterized New York public authorities.12 Thus, the New York legislature and the 
courts must not only redress the harms that will be caused by misconduct on the part 
of public authorities, but also further strengthen the enforcement provisions of the 
Reform Act. This note contends that the imposition of significant fines on negligent 
and self-dealing board members will strike a proper balance between redressability 
and deterrence, thereby serving the underlying goals of the Reform Act.
 Part II explores the historical role and importance of public authorities in New 
York State, as well as the problems and abuses that led to the enactment of the Public 
Authority Accountability Act and, later, the Reform Act. Part III examines the Reform 
Act and illustrates, first, why the fiduciary provisions cannot be effectively enforced by 
the public and, second, the limitations of the Reform Act’s current enforcement 
mechanisms. Part IV proposes a limited role for citizen enforcement, without 
compromising notions of sovereign immunity, through the imposition of fines.
10. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824; see also Senior Partner Ira M. Millstein Applies Foundational Corporate 
Governance Experience to Groundbreaking State Legislation, Weil Gotshal News (Mar. 9, 2006), http://
www.weil.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=25745.
The Model Corporate Governance Principles that Mr. Millstein eventually presented 
to the governor had its foundations in the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but drew 
significantly on the governance best practices he usually prescribes to his corporate 
clients. Touching on subjects including the training of public authority board members, 
the separation of oversight and executive functions, and the ethical conduct of all public 
authority directors, officers and employees, Mr. Millstein helped to establish a set of 
principles which ensure that public authorities in New York State are held to the 
strictest standards of ethics and professional responsibility.
 Id.
11. Pub. Auth. § 2824 (McKinney 2011). 
12. N.Y. State Office of the State Comptroller, Public Authority Reform, Reining in New 
York’s Secret Government (2004) [hereinafter Reining in New York’s Secret Government], 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb04/publicauthorityreform.pdf.
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II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN NEW YORK STATE
 A. Introduction to Public Authorities
 Public authorities are state-chartered public benefit corporations created “to 
finance, build, manage, or improve capital assets and further public works.”13 They 
supplement the legislature’s work by spearheading public projects through a 
corporate-like model. Public authorities accomplish this by arranging financing for 
projects and overseeing important government infrastructure.14 These entities, which 
are usually overseen by a board of directors, typically issue bonds to fund important 
public projects such as transportation infrastructure, housing, and hospitals.15 The 
creation and need for public authorities evolved from the government’s obligation to 
provide adequate public services.16 Because of constitutional restraints on debt 
issuance that prohibit the State from borrowing excessively, the State found it more 
convenient to use public authorities to fund these projects.17 The birth of independent 
public authorities allowed for the issuance of debt to finance capital projects without 
the State having to assume the liabilities.18
 The first modern public authority in New York State was the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, created in 1921 to enhance regional port facilities.19 
However, the real potential of public authorities emerged under master-builder 
Robert Moses, who used, among others, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority to finance and build much of New York’s modern infrastructure.20 Over a 
forty-four year period, Moses’s projects included the Triborough Bridge, Jones Beach 
State Park, and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge.21 While celebrated for influencing 
13. Ira M. Millstein et al., New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform Report 
(2006) [hereinafter Commission on Public Authority Reform Report], http://www.abo.state.
ny.us/commissionPublicAuth/FinalReport.pdf.
14. See Citizens Budget Comm’n, New York’s Public Authorities: Promoting Accountability 
and Taming Debt (2006) [hereinafter CBC Public Authority Problems], http://www.cbcny.org/
sites/default/files/reportsummary_authorities_06012006.pdf.
15. See Citizens Budget Comm’n, Public Authorities in New York State (2006) [hereinafter CBC 
2006 Report], http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/report_authorities_04012006.pdf (highlighting 
the historical problems of public authorities and suggesting reforms).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Schultz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 244 (1994) (Noting that public authorities would “protect the State 
from liability and enable public projects to be carried on free from restrictions otherwise applicable” 
(quoting In re Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Thruway 
Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420 (1995)).
19. CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 1.
20. See Paul Goldberger, Obituary, Robert Moses, Master Builder, is Dead at 92, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at A1.
21. Id.
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the “planning of cities around the nation,” Moses’s power highlighted the potential 
for abuses in authority governance.22
 In carrying out their mandates, New York public authorities differ from other 
state agencies because they have traditionally been exempt from certain oversight and 
accountability requirements.23 For example, key decisions relating to expenditures 
and large projects are often not subject to outside voter approval.24 The public 
authorities’ autonomy balances “political accountability and political independence” 
by allowing an authority “to make difficult and unpopular decisions outside the 
arena of elected politics.”25 Consequently, over the years some New York public 
authorities have abused this autonomy, as evidenced by excessive spending, 
insufficient disclosure, and the accumulation of massive debt.26 To understand the 
magnitude of this, it was reported that public authority expenditures equal eighty-
four percent of New York’s general fund spending.27
 B. How Public Authorities Operate
 As of August 2010, there were 323 state authorities and 771 local authorities in 
New York.28 New York authorities vary in spending levels, mission, and governance. 
Among the largest in size, as measured by annual spending, are the New York 
22. Id.; see generally Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York 
(Vintage Books ed. 1975).
23. For an overview of how public authorities work, see What Is a Public Authority?, N.Y. Office of the State 
Comptroller, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/whatisauthority.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
24. See CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 14–22. This note uses “outside voter approval” to refer to those 
other than the public authority board members.
25. See id. at iv.
26. See Casey Seiler, Shadow Government Debt Hits $52 Billion, Times Union (Albany), Aug. 11, 2010, at A3, 
available at http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Shadow-government-debt-hits-52-billion-612662.
php; see also N.Y. Office of the State Comptroller, New York’s Public Authorities by the 
Numbers (2010) [hereinafter New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers], www.osc.state.ny.us/
pubauth/reports/pub-auth-num.pdf.
27. Seiler, supra note 26; see also Ceasar supra note 6.
28. New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26. “State” and “local” authorities are 
statutorily defined under N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2 (McKinney 2011).
1.  “state authority” shall mean a public authority or public benefit corporation created 
by or existing under this chapter or any other law of the state of New York, with one 
or more of its members appointed by the governor or who serve as members by 
virtue of holding a civil office of the state, other than an interstate or international 
authority or public benefit corporation, including subsidiaries of such public 
authority or public benefit corporation.
2.  “local authority” shall mean (a) a public authority or public benefit corporation 
created by or existing under this chapter or any other law of the state of New York 
whose members do not hold a civil office of the state, are not appointed by the 
governor or are appointed by the governor specifically upon the recommendation of 
the local government or governments; (b) a not-for-profit corporation affiliated 
with, sponsored by, or created by a county, city, town or village government; (c) a 
local industrial developmental agency or authority or other local public benefit 
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Dormitory Authority, Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), and New York State 
Thruway Authority.29? ????????? ??????????????? ?????????????????? ??????
?????????????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ????????????
authorities, play an equally pivotal role in serving New Yorkers and are equally prone 
to excessive spending and debt accumulation.30
 The three principal ways public authorities borrow to accomplish their goals and 
fund their projects are project revenue debt, private conduit debt, and state-supported 
debt.31 Revenue bonds are repaid with the funds or revenue generated by the 
authority’s projects. For example, an authority may issue bonds to build a bridge; 
thereafter, toll-collecting serves to repay the debt incurred by the project.32 In this 
case, the public authority is “self-supporting, able to meet debt obligations through 
revenues obtained from its own valuable assets, such as fares and user fees.”33
 Public authorities also issue conduit debt “on behalf of a private individual or 
firm in order to take advantage of federal tax exemptions.”34 In this situation, the 
private entity, such as a university or hospital, not the government, becomes the 
source for repaying the debt.35 The private entity takes on the responsibility of the 
debt, rather than the public entity. Conduit debt is often used for financing housing, 
healthcare, or educational infrastructure because these public institutions stand to 
benefit most from the favorable tax treatment.36
 The third type of authority debt, state-supported debt, is the largest portion of 
public authority debt and the most controversial because it implicates tax dollars. In 
????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????????????? ???? ??????????? ?????????
appropriated to repay the interest and principal of this debt.37 The bonds issued are 
corporation; (d) an affiliate of such local authority; or (e) a land bank corporation 
created pursuant to article sixteen of the not-for-profit corporation law.
 Id.
29. N.Y. State Auths. Budget Office, Annual Report on Public Authorities in New York State 
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 ABO Report], www.abo.state.ny.us/reports/annualreports/
ABO2011AnnualReport.pdf. The MTA is one of the hundreds of public authorities in New York State. 
The MTA’s spending accounts for roughly twenty-two percent of the state’s authority debt. Id. at 17.
30. For example, the Trust for Cultural Resources of the County of Onondaga “is an authorized issuer of 
bonds for non-profit cultural organizations” and “offers a local, convenient and more economical 
financing opportunity for the Onondaga County’s non-profit establishments.” Onondaga County Trust 
for Cultural Resources, Economic Development Services, Syracuse Central, http://www.syracusecentral.
com/Economic-Development-Services-Trust-for-Cultural-Resources.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
31. CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14. For more information and specific figures on 
public authority debt, see Data on Public Authority Debt, N.Y. State Comptroller, http://www.osc.
state.ny.us/pubauth/data/pa_debt_june2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
32. CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 6.
33. Schultz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 244 (1994).
34. CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 6.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 12.
37. Wilson Memo, supra note 3.
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“backed by appropriations of state controlled revenues to secure projects set forth in 
the State’s capital plan,” which can range from schools to highways.38
 State-supported public authority debt per household in New York reached $7,900 
in 2009.39 This public authority debt is problematic not only because of the amount 
outstanding, but also because it is issued largely through “backdoor” borrowing.40 
Backdoor borrowing (or spending) refers to state-supported debt that is not subject 
to voter approval.41 In 2009, the Office of the New York State Comptroller reported 
that “more than 94 percent of all long-term State-funded debt outstanding was issued 
by public authorities.”42 This means that in New York, voters had approved only 
about six percent of state-supported debt.43
 Critics contend that such borrowing by public authorities “limits accountability 
and transparency by circumventing public participation and transferring control over 
the spending of billions of taxpayer dollars to largely autonomous public authority 
boards.”44 A second problem with backdoor debt is that it “has been applied to cover 
the State’s operating expenses rather than for capital investments” without proper 
government oversight and functions without voter approval.45
 C. Events Leading to the Public Authority Accountability Act
 A 2004 report by State Comptroller Alan Hevesi46 noted that “past practices by 
[New York] authorities reveals a history of unethical and, at times, illegal activities.”47 
These “practices” by appointed authority board members included bribery, nepotism, 
funding and resource misuse, excessive pay, ethical misconduct, and negligent 
decisionmaking. In the last twenty years, numerous scandals and illegal public 
authority practices have been exposed, often including a recurrence of wrongdoings.48 
38. Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 12. “After the State’s capital budget 
is negotiated, specific capital projects are assigned by the legislature to designated Authorities.” Id. at 12 n.5.
39. New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26, at 2.
40. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 21.
41. Assemblywoman Nancy Calhoun, Crushing Debt Fed by Unlawful Borrowing, N.Y. State Assembly 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://assembly.state.ny.us/mem/Nancy-Calhoun/story/41558/.
42. New York’s Public Authorities by the Numbers, supra note 26, at 2.
43. See id.
44. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 21.
45. CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 14.
46. Ironically, though “the State Comptroller is responsible for ensuring that the taxpayers’ money is being 
used effectively and efficiently to promote the common good,” What are the Comptroller’s Responsibilities?, 
Office of the State Comptroller, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/about/response.htm (last visited Feb. 
18, 2012), in 2006 Alan Hevesi pled guilty to corruption charges stemming from a pension investment, 
see Michael Cooper, Hevesi Pleads Guilty to a Felony and Resigns, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2006, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/nyregion/23hevesi.html.
47. Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12, at 29.
48. Id. The Executive Director of the New York State Bridge Authority was investigated and audited in 
1986 and 2003 for “inappropriate business expenses.” Id. Similarly, the New York Convention Center 
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There have been noteworthy examples of past authority misconduct over the years. 
For instance, a board appointed a former state assemblyman with no experience in 
energy matters as chairman of the New York Power Authority.49 Also significant was 
the New York Dormitory Authority’s loss of $21 million due to inappropriate and 
ill-advised investments by unqualified employees.50 The New York State Thruway 
Authority’s decision to sell to a private developer exclusive access rights to the Erie 
Canal for only $30,000 when they were likely valued at a much higher amount was 
another example of controversial decisionmaking.51
 While the range of authority misconduct is diverse, authority board members 
often play central roles.52 It eventually became clear to New York lawmakers that 
misconduct by public authority board members, and the failure to discover it, could 
be attributed to lax statutory oversight and accountability requirements. A report by 
the Citizens Budget Commission highlighted five recurring problems with public 
authority governance in New York State: “[i]nsufficient reporting and accountability,” 
“[i]nsufficient independence in governance,” “[m]isuse of the power to incur 
government-backed debt,” “[i]nsufficient oversight and coordination of project 
revenue debt,” and “[i]neffective use of private conduit debt.”53 The Public Authority 
Accountability Act sought to address these problems. In addition to the creation of 
the independent Authorities Budget Office, which was charged with overseeing 
authority operations, practices and reports to ensure compliance, the Public Authority 
Accountability Act codified model board governance principles.54 These principles 
and guidelines, derived from governance models used by the private sector, included 
training on ethical duties and responsibilities, establishment of codes of conduct, and 
strategies to minimize conflicts of interest.55
Operating Corporation, which operated the Javitz Center at the time, faced racketeering and extortion 
charges throughout the 1990s. Id.
49. Id. at 33.
50. Id. at 30; see Susan Chira, College Project Put Off as Agency Faces Fiscal Woes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2006, 
at A3.
51. Michael Cooper, State Cancels Deal to Develop Erie Canal, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2004, at B1 (“After 
defending the contract for months, officials at the Canal Corporation, a subsidiary of the New York 
State Thruway Authority that [had] awarded the contract three years ago, decided to end it.”). Regarding 
this transaction, which was later voided by Governor Pataki, one legislator commented, “This state is 
selling used trucks for more than” that amount. Lydia Polgreen, Selling Off Access to the Erie Canal; 
Developer’s $30,000 Purchase Raises Concerns About the Process, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2003, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/29/nyregion/selling-off-access-erie-canal-developer-s-
30000-purchase-raises-concerns-about.html?pagewanted=2.
52. See generally Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12.
53. CBC Public Authority Problems, supra note 14, at 2.
54. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29. See generally N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824 (McKinney 2011). In 
addition to the codification of fiduciary duties, the law provides that an authority board member must 
understand “his or her duty of loyalty and care to the organization and commitment to the authority’s 
mission and the public interest.” Id. § 2824(1)(g).
55. Id.; Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
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 D. The Public Authority Reform Act
 Even after the Public Authority Accountability Act was passed, several legislators 
found that public authority board members still “operated in secret, mismanaged 
resources, and showered developers with sweetheart deals.”56 Therefore members of 
the New York State Assembly believed it was necessary to amend the law in order to 
address the abuses initially contemplated in the Public Authority Accountability Act. 
In 2009, the New York State Assembly amended the Public Authority Accountability 
Act by passing the Reform Act to both give the Authorities Budget Office (ABO) 
more oversight power and strengthen the ethical obligations and disclosure 
requirements of public authority directors.57
 Under the Reform Act, all board members now have a fiduciary duty that is 
arguably enforceable by the Authorities Budget Office Director.58 The law states in 
pertinent part that board members must perform their duties
in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which an 
ordinarily prudent person in like position would use under similar 
circumstances, and may take into consideration the views and policies of any 
elected official or body, or other person and ultimately apply independent 
judgment in the best interest of the authority, its mission and the public.59
Additionally, the Sponsor’s Memorandum calls for board members to execute an 
acknowledgement of these fiduciary duties, obligating board members to possess a 
basic command of their duties, specific to each board, and competency to carry out 
their functions.60
 Corporate governance expert Ira Milstein developed the Reform Act’s fiduciary 
duty provisions based on the private corporate governance model.61 Under Delaware 
56. Press Release, N.Y. State Legislature, Senators Urge Governor to Sign Authorities Reform Bill (Aug. 21 
2009), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/AuthorityReformPressRelease.pdf. After the 
passage of the Public Authority Accountability Act it was found that, “[a]dditional reforms and fixes are 
necessary to make the system more accountable and transparent.” Legislative Memo, 2009 N.Y. Sess. 
Law News Ch. 505 (McKinney). The amended law also established whistleblower protections, 
additional debt issuance limits, and rules for the disposition of authority property. See Press Release, 
supra note 4.
57. See Scott Fein, The Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009, 11 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Gov’t L. & Pol’y J. 102, 
103 (2009).
58. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
59. Pub. Auth. § 2824(1)(g).
60. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8.
61. See Governor’s Task Force on the Implementation of the 2009 Public Authorities Reform 
Act 10 (2010) [hereinafter Task Force Report], http://www.abo.state.ny.us/aboTaskForce/
ParaTaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
Over the years, the Delaware courts have articulated and enforced fiduciary duties of 
directors under state law on a case-by-case basis. This body of law has become the 
backbone of best practices for boards of public corporations. In recent times, it has also 
been recognized as applicable to not- for-profit corporations, irrespective of the fact that 
not-for-profit corporations have no shareholders, on the grounds that they have 
identifiable constituents that are highly dependent on them. If anything, the case is even 
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law, company shareholders may judicially challenge a board member’s breach of 
fiduciary duty.62 These duties require that board members act “on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.”63 If challenged, board members may then defend their conduct 
pursuant to the business judgment rule. The business judgement rule “exists to 
protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power.”64 Where 
“the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of 
loyalty or acted in bad faith . . . the burden then shifts to the director defendants to 
demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation 
and its shareholders.”65 A failure of the directors to meet this burden results in 
liability.66 Courts have found directors liable for a violation of their fiduciary duties 
based on conduct that amounts to gross negligence or blatant disregard for shareholder 
interests.67 Loosely analogizing taxpaying state citizens to shareholders of a 
corporation suggests that public authority directors could be found liable for taking 
action against the public’s best interests if it was made without justification. From 
this perspective, it was easy to see the appeal of utilizing the private sector model for 
the Reform Act, as misconduct by directors of public sector boards could potentially 
hurt tax-paying citizens.68
 The drafters of the Reform Act codified these fiduciary duties to focus authority 
boards “on their legal obligations, including understanding that these duties are the 
means by which the board carries out the mission of the authority.”69 The legislature 
believed that the establishment of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care were 
essential to improve authority governance and deter negligence and self-dealing.70 
????????? ???? ??????? ???????????????? ????????????? ????????????? ??? ????? ????????? ???? ????
citizens of the State and the resources public authorities expend, are the State’s resources.
 Id.
62. See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
64. Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
65. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). Private shareholders may obtain 
information about board member actions from the website of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
Search, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/search/search.htm (last 
modified July 19, 2011) (follow “Search” hyperlink; then search by “Company Filings,” “SEC 
Documents,” or by a general “Search Engine”). New Yorkers do not have this right against public 
authority board members.
66. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 53.
67. See Smith, 488 A.2d 858 (holding company directors liable for gross negligence). Although this case has 
been overturned via statute, it still stands for a proposition that board directors can be held liable for 
breach of their fiduciary duty. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
68. See Adam P. Gordon, Suggested Best Practices for Municipal Issuers in Light of Recent Enforcement Trends, 
24 J. Tax’n & Reg. Fin. Institutions 33 (2011).
69. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 1. 
70. Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8. The drafters believed that “with ‘good’ governance and the 
effectuation of fiduciary duties, it is far more likely that ‘bad’ performance will be avoided.” Task Force 
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The government Task Force on the Implementation of the 2009 Public Authorities 
Reform Act (the “Task Force”) led by Millstein made recommendations regarding 
the Reform Act’s implementation and explained when the fiduciary duties are 
implicated. The duty of loyalty is breached when a board member’s judgment “is, or 
could be, influenced by a factor (fear, friendship, personal gain).”71 Regarding the 
duty of care, the Task Force noted that board members must make informed, 
independent decisions that do not waste the authority’s assets.72 Millstein further 
clarified the fiduciary duties as follows:
The business judgment rule . . . means: you don’t have to be right. You can 
make a mistake. And you can even make a decision where [] the ABO says, 
[w]e didn’t think that was a good idea or [y]ou shouldn’t have done that. That’s not 
going to get you into trouble. What’s going to get you into trouble is when 
you didn’t pay attention, you didn’t have a process, you didn’t think about it, 
and you didn’t make up your mind independently about what to do.73
 While the fiduciary provisions of the Reform Act are clearly defined, because 
they were recently enacted, the statute’s enforcement mechanisms have yet to be 
tested. Consequently, it is essential to identify and remedy any apparent weaknesses 
in these provisions. Adequate oversight and compliance are critical to meaningful 
public authority reform. Yet it remains to be seen whether the statute will be able to 
meet its objectives.
III. A WEAK ENFORCEMENT REGIME
 A hypothetical example of a breach of fiduciary duty by a director of a New York 
public authority illustrates the limited public remedies available to taxpayers seeking 
redress, and how the Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions would be enforced.
 In conjunction with an urban redevelopment proposal, a hypothetical state-run 
public authority in New York agrees to sell its land to a politically connected private 
developer for $250,000 less than the fair market value, deliberately failing to conduct 
research because the developer is one of the top campaign donors of one of the state’s 
prominent mayors (the “Mayor”). The authority’s directors know that the Mayor has 
pledged to “take care” of them when their terms on the board expire. Despite cries 
from angry locals protesting the sale, the redevelopment project moves forward with 
the board’s approval. With their objections ignored, citizens seek judicial intervention 
Report, supra note 61, at 10.
71. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 11.
72. See id.
73. Norman Oder, What’s Violating Fiduciary Duty for a Public Authority?, Atlantic Yards Report (July 
16, 2010), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/07/whats-violating-fiduciary-duty-for.html 
(quoting Ira Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Panel Discussion at the Albany Law 
School Symposium: Discussion of the Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009 (Apr. 27, 2009), available 
at http://www.totalwebcasting.com/view/?id=albanylaw). To illustrate the point, Millstein offers an 
example of a board member sleeping during a meeting. Such conduct would only be actionable if the 
board member went to the board meeting with the intention of sleeping. Id. 
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to both halt the sale and hold the board members responsible for potentially negligent 
and self-serving actions relating to the sale.74
 However, New York State law currently provides a limited public remedy. 
Specifically, in this hypothetical, the law would likely deny citizens standing to 
obtain the relief they seek and would provide no private right of action. Furthermore, 
despite the Reform Act’s stated purpose to increase the transparency and 
accountability of public authority boards, taxpaying New Yorkers and the authorities 
are unlikely to find themselves with legal recourse under the statute; this is partially 
due to the bureaucratic and inefficient enforcement mechanisms already in place.75 
Part A of this section examines how citizens will likely be found to lack both standing 
and a private right of action, thus precluding them from challenging board decisions. 
Part B analyzes the likely operation and effect of the Reform Act’s built-in 
enforcement provisions after alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. This includes an 
analysis of the official empowered with removal and whether those enforcement 
provisions actually achieve the goals of the statute. This note concludes that the 
Reform Act, as passed, lacks the capability to successfully deter and prevent 
misconduct by public authority board members.
 A. A Limited Public Remedy
  1. Lack of Standing
 The hypothetical above is loosely based on a case decided shortly before the 
Reform Act’s passage. In Montgomery v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the 
petitioners, who included a community advocacy group, alleged that the MTA failed 
to comply with the competitive bidding provisions under the Public Authority 
Accountability Act by selling a government rail yard to a private developer without 
getting an appraisal and soliciting additional bids.76 The community group claimed 
associational standing stemming from an interest in the Public Authority 
Accountability Act’s “purpose of promoting accountability, transparency and ethics.”77 
74. See the competitive bidding provisions of N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2897 (McKinney 2011).
[T]he award shall be made with reasonable promptness by notice to the responsible 
bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to 
the state, price and other factors considered; provided, that all bids may be rejected 
when it is in the public interest to do so.
 Id. This hypothetical scenario was modeled on Montgomery v. MTA, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at 
*1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 15, 2009). Of that case, the Reform Act sponsor, Richard Brodsky, suggested 
that the MTA had breached its fiduciary duty. See Norman Oder, Brodsky: MTA Board’s Acceptance of 
Ratner’s Lesser Offer for Railyard Would Violate its Fiduciary Duty, Atlantic Yards Report (June 8, 2009), 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/06/brodsky-mta-boards-acceptance-of.html.
75. See discussion infra Part III.B.
76. No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *9. In this instance the court found that the board of directors 
had sufficient reasons for not soliciting additional bids. Id.
77. Id. at *4. The court in Montgomery did not consider a possible breach of fiduciary duty because it had not 
been alleged by petitioners. Also, the Reform Act had not yet taken effect to codify the fiduciary duties. 
See id.
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The court dismissed the petitioner’s claims, finding they lacked standing because they 
could not show injury in fact. The court ruled that the petitioner’s interests were 
“indistinguishable from those of any other member of the general public.”78 At the 
same time, however, Judge Stallman acknowledged in dicta that “hypothetically there 
could be no way of judicially challenging what could be a clear violation of the 
appraisal and bidding provisions.”79 He further noted that it “is appropriately within 
the province of the Court of Appeals to consider whether a different standard for 
standing should be applied.”80 The court therefore raised the question, but did not 
decide, whether the inability of taxpayers to challenge the Public Authority 
Accountability Act’s competitive bidding provisions posed an insurmountable barrier 
to judicial review.81
 The court’s recognition of this issue is noteworthy because it suggests that 
permitting citizens to challenge the conduct of unelected board members might 
serve an important public purpose.82 As the New York Court of Appeals asserted in 
Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, “[a] fundamental tenet of our system of remedies is 
that when a government agency seeks to act in a manner adversely affecting a party, 
judicial review of that action may be had.”83 However, for now, it is clear that under 
Montgomery, ordinary citizens who cannot show injury in fact will not be able to 
establish standing under the Public Authority Accountability Act and likely they 
will be equally barred under the Reform Act.84
 New York State Finance Law section 123-b, which provides an alternative 
mechanism for citizens to establish standing without requiring injury in fact, does not 
apply in the context of public authority decisionmaking.85 The statute allows taxpayers 
78. Id. at *4. There are compelling reasons why broadening the standing requirements to allow these suits 
may be dangerous. See In re Abrams v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 992 (1976); Soc’y of Plastics 
???????? ????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????? ????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ???
??????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???????????????????? ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ?????
concrete interest in prosecuting the action which casts the dispute ‘in a form traditionally capable of 
judicial resolution.’”).
79. Id. at *4.
80. Montgomery, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *5; see also Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 38 
N.Y.2d 6 (1975) (citing a broader standard for recognizing standing).
81. In re Abrams, 39 N.Y.2d 990. The court observed that “standing has been properly extended to permit an 
appropriate judicial proceeding to prevent an illegal disbursement or to compel a legally required 
disbursement of public funds. This extension has been made to prevent the erection of an impenetrable 
barrier to judicial review of unlawful official action.” Id. at 992. 
82. See generally Montgomery, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1. 
83. 38 N.Y.2d at 10. 
84. To date, no one has brought suit under the Reform Act.
85. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 123-b (McKinney 2011).
[A]ny person, who is a citizen taxpayer, whether or not such person is or may be affected 
or specially aggrieved by the activity herein referred to, may maintain an action for 
equitable or declaratory relief, or both, against an officer or employee of the state who in 
the course of his or her duties has caused, is now causing, or is about to cause a wrongful 
expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or any other illegal or unconstitutional 
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to bring suit to prevent the “wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication”86 
of state funds when there is a “sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the State.”87 Thus, 
for a citizen taxpayer to sue the government alleging waste, the conduct must be more 
than unwise???????? ?????? ????????88 However, the New York Court of Appeals has 
exempted public authorities from such suits under the finance law.89 In New York Post 
Corp. v. Moses, the court reasoned that public authorities are not agents of the state 
because “they are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to 
function freedom and f lexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board.”90 
Consequently, the taxpayer waste statute affords no redress for New Yorkers seeking to 
challenge authority board decisions unless the conduct at issue is illegal.91
  2. No Private Right of Action
 While the Reform Act is silent on whether the fiduciary duty provisions confer a 
private right of action for breach of such a duty, the statute’s legislative history is clear 
that the drafters intended no such right.92 Even in the absence of legislative intent, it 
is difficult to imagine a scenario that would satisfy the first prong of New York’s 
???????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ??????
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the general public.93 Although the Sponsor’s Memorandum does not explain the 
legislature’s justification for prohibiting standing by a private citizen, we may assume 
it feared exposing authority boards to frivolous litigation that could impact their 
disbursement of state funds or state property, except that the provisions of this subdivision 
shall not apply to . . . any public corporation or public benefit corporation.
 Id. There are other bases on which to bring citizen suits without direct injury; for example, a municipality’s 
failure to comply with an Environmental Impact Statement in New York can be challenged pursuant to an 
Article 78 proceeding.
86. Id.
87. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 805 (2003) (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 813–814.
89. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. N.Y. MTA., 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep’t 2005); New York Post Corp. 
v. Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 207 (1961) (holding that allowing taxpayer suits under the state finance law 
“destroy[s] the ‘freedom and f lexibility’ necessary for [the] functioning” of public authorities).
90. 10 N.Y.2d at 203–204 (quoting Plumbing Ass’n v. Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420, 423 (1959)).
91. While poor authority decisionmaking may be unethical and wasteful to taxpayers, it is not per se illegal. 
92. The legislative history states
Section 11-a of the bill would amend [the Public Authorities Law] to provide for the 
removal by the appointing authority of an authority member who breaches his or her 
fiduciary duty. Neither PAL § 2827 nor PAL § 2824(1) provide for, nor is it the intent 
of this bill to create, a private right of action for a breach of fiduciary duty.
 Legislative Memorandum, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 506, § 11-a (McKinney) [hereinafter Legislative 
Memorandum]. 
93. Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 906 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
2010). 
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ability to perform.94 Therefore, the legislature’s refusal to provide a private right of 
action under the Reform Act serves as yet another barrier to citizen suits challenging 
public authority board members’ conduct.
 The legislature’s decision to protect public authority boards from time-consuming 
and expensive citizen lawsuits was certainly rational, as opening the so-called 
“f loodgates” might prevent board members from carrying out their duties, fearful of 
making necessary but unpopular decisions.95 One could easily imagine self-
proclaimed “citizen heroes” bringing frivolous suits alleging breached fiduciary 
duties.96 While public authority autonomy has led to abuses, it has also fostered 
independent decisionmaking that has benefitted the public.97 Should authority 
boards have to defend every decision in court, they may act or not act for fear of 
liability rather than for the public good.
 On the other hand, if the legislature strips the public of its ability to judicially 
challenge negligent or self-dealing public authority boards, it should provide the 
oversight and resources necessary to enforce the fiduciary duty provisions of the 
Reform Act. However, an analysis of the Reform Act’s current enforcement provisions 
reveals several significant weaknesses that undermine its goal of meaningful public 
authority reform.
 B. Enforcement of the Fiduciary Obligations under the Reform Act
  1. Removal of Board Members for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
 The Reform Act sets forth a relatively straightforward procedure for the removal 
of board members for misconduct. Pursuant to section 2827 of the Reform Act, a 
board member can be removed for breach of fiduciary duty by “the public officer or 
public body which is empowered . . . to appoint such authority.”98 Because of the 
94. See Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993); see discussion of the legislators’ fears infra Part IV.
95. See discussion of Moses supra Part III.A.
96. However, this is not the case under taxpayer waste suits pursuant to N.Y. State Fin. Law § 123-b 
(McKinney 2011). While the statistics regarding the frequency of taxpayer waste suits in New York 
have not been compiled to this author’s knowledge, comprehensive searches on Westlaw, New York 
State court web sites, and internet search engines support the inference that these claims are not 
frequently litigated.
97. CBC 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 4–5.
98. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2827 (McKinney 2011).
Removal of authority members. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every 
member of every authority or commission heretofore or hereafter continued or created 
by this chapter, except ex-officio members, that is, members whose membership results 
by virtue of their incumbency of a public office, shall be removable by the public officer 
or public body which is empowered by this chapter to appoint such authority or 
commission member, for inefficiency, breach of fiduciary duty, neglect of duty or 
misconduct in office, provided, however, that such member shall be given a copy of the 
charges against him and an opportunity of being heard in person, or by counsel, in his 
or her defense upon not less than ten days’ notice.
 Id.
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diversity of public authorities throughout New York State, “[i]ndividual authorizing 
statutes define the number of board members and assign responsibility for their 
appointment.”99 In some circumstances, only the governor or county executive will 
have removal power.100 Additionally, the Authorities Budget Office may investigate 
and make removal recommendations to the appointing entity if it finds breaches of 
fiduciary duties.101 Should those recommendations be disregarded, the ABO may 
refer the matter to the Office of the Attorney General or local district attorney, who 
may bring charges.102 Although this framework for enforcement initially appears 
logical and efficient, in practice it is unworkable due to the prospect of cronyism and 
the bureaucratic obstacles discussed below.103
  2. A Weak Authorities Budget Office
 The Authorities Budget Office may “initiate formal investigations, issue subpoenas, 
publicly warn and censure public authorities for non-compliance and recommend the 
suspension or dismissal of public authority board members and officers,” but lacks the 
power of removal.104 Thus, while touted as a powerful, independent watchdog capable 
of reining in negligent and self-dealing authority boards, the ABO emerges as just a 
single voice with no direct removal power in a complex bureaucratic web.105 Without 
the power of suspension or removal, it is unlikely the Authorities Budget Office will be 
able to enforce the statute’s fiduciary duty provisions. Consequently, without legislative 
action, remedies for board misconduct under the current law will have to come from 
outside the Authorities Budget Office.106
99. Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, Public Authorities in New York State: Accelerating 
Momentum to Achieve Reform 18 (2005), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/pubauth/
pubauthoritiesreform.pdf.
100. The governor has appointment/removal power for board members of the MTA. Pub. Auth. § 2827. See 
Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Office David Paterson, Governor David Paterson Appoints Jay Walder 
to Serve as CEO and Chair of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (July 14, 2009), http://www.
governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/press_0714092.html.
101. Pub. Auth. § 2827. 
102. Id.
103. For examples of misconduct, see Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12, at 30–38.
104. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18.
105. A New York Times article published in 2009 ref lects the political rhetoric that exaggerates the ABO’s 
power under the Reform Act by reporting that the ABO may “initiate the suspension or removal of 
board members.” There is no such statutory language. See Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Signs Bill to 
Rein in State’s Free-Spending Public Authorities, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2009, at A14, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/nyregion/12authorities.html?_r=1.
106. Although administrative and procedural checks exist for public authorities, such as the New York Public 
Authorities Control Board (PACB), these checks are relatively powerless to deter breaches of fiduciary 
duty. For example, the PACB serves to approve any project-related financings by public authorities. See 
Department of Health of the State of New York Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2011A, 
Dormitory Authority of the State of New York 29 (2011), http://www.dasny.org/dasny/OS_
fiscal_1112/Downloads/DOHRefudingFinalOS.pdf.
1583
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
 In addition to its limited statutory enforcement powers, the Authorities Budget 
Office lacks the resources to succeed in its objectives. According to its 2010 Annual 
Report, the Authorities Budget Office “has neither the resources nor the time to 
independently evaluate the veracity of all the information it receives.”107 The Task 
Force report on the Reform Act’s implementation corroborates this finding.108 
Currently, the Authorities Budget Office only employs eight full-time staff members 
and has an operating budget of less than $1.8 million.109 While the Reform Act 
assumes that the Authorities Budget Office will delegate work to state agencies, such 
as the Office of Comptroller and Attorney General,110 it is inconceivable that these 
eight individuals could actively monitor the state’s 1100 plus public authorities. It is 
not clear if and when Albany will allocate the additional funding necessary for the 
Authorities Budget Office to establish a meaningful presence.
 A brief examination of public authority compliance with the mandatory reporting 
requirements of the Reform Act, since its passage, underscores the ABO’s limited 
ability to provide the oversight with which it has been entrusted.111 While state public 
authorities have generally adhered to the new reporting requirements, the Authorities 
Budget Office has failed to compel local public authority compliance.112 In fact, for 
the 2010 reporting period, only fifty-six percent of local public authorities adhered to 
the new annual reporting requirements, up only six percent from 2009.113 Under the 
Reform Act, each authority is responsible for the compilation and accuracy of 
reported data.114 However, it is questionable whether boards who have violated their 
fiduciary duties will actively and properly disclose certain information. This note 
posits, the Authorities Budget Office’s rule requiring an authority’s chief financial 
officer to verify the data reported provides “some assurance” of accuracy is simply 
unrealistic because individuals are unlikely to disclose their misdeeds.115 Consequently, 
107. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 12.
108. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 21 (“[T]he ABO does not have sufficient staff to undertake 
an analysis of debt practices, study the consolidation, restructuring or reformation of authorities, 
conduct simultaneous on site reviews, or to focus on other issues of importance.”). 
109. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 3; Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, 2009–2010 
Executive Budget, Authorities Budget Office (2010), http://www.budget.state.ny.us/pubs/
archive/fy0910archive/eBudget0910/agencyPresentations/appropData/authorityBudgetOffice.html 
(last visited Nov. 13 2010).
110. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18.
111. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 1.
112. Id. at 1.
113. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 10; 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 11. This figure excludes 
industrial development agencies and local development corporation. According to the ABO, there is an 
?????????????? ????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????????????????????? ??????
renewal and community development agencies.” 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 10.
114. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 11.
115. See id. (“The requirement that the Chief Executive or Chief Fiscal officer certify as to the accuracy and 
completeness of the data, coupled with the board’s approval, should provide the ABO with some 
assurance that the information is reliable for analytical and public disclosure purposes.”)
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it is expected that a chief financial officer who is responsible for authorizing or 
engaging in misspending will openly disclose it to the Authorities Budget Office. 
Although the Authorities Budget Office proclaims the ability to sanction non-
complying authorities, it is not clear how those penalties will be carried out and 
whether they will deter non-compliance.
  3. Enforcement to Date
 Although the Authorities Budget Office has conducted compliance reports and 
published its findings, it has only fully pursued one enforcement action to date.116 In 
April 2010, the Authorities Budget Office recommended dismissal of the entire 
board of the New York State Theatre Institute, but did so only after the State 
Inspector General reported that the director of the board improperly used state funds 
for personal benefit.117 The Authorities Budget Office immediately reviewed the 
Inspector General’s report and recommended the board’s removal pursuant to its 
authority.118 The next month, Governor Paterson dissolved the board.119
 While this enforcement action was consistent with the Reform Act’s objectives, 
the ABO took action per its statutory mandate only after the Inspector General 
made its recommendation.120 Therefore, it appears that the Authorities Budget 
Office’s responsibilities are largely duplicative of other agencies. This view echoes 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s belief that the Reform Act does little 
and merely “sets up another level of bureaucracy.”121 In the Theatre Institute case, it 
is unclear why the Inspector General could not simply recommend the dissolution of 
the Theatre Institute. The Authorities Budget Office did little more than “rubber 
stamp” the Inspector General’s findings and did not pursue its own investigation. In 
no circumstance can such action be deemed to satisfy the rigorous exercise of 
meaningful enforcement envisioned by the legislature.122
116. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 8.
117. State of N.Y. Office of the Inspector General, Report of Investigation of the New York 
State Theatre Institute (2010), http://ig.state.ny.us/pdfs/ReportofInvestigationoftheNewYorkState 
TheaterInstitute.pdf.
118. 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7, at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Gabe Pressman, Public Authority Reform Bill May Lose in City Hall, NBC N.Y. (July 29, 2009, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local-beat/PublicAuthorityreform.html (“The mayor’s press 
secretary Stu Loeser said Bloomberg was opposed to this legislation for two main reasons, ‘It sets up 
another level of bureaucracy,’ he says, ‘and it requires people who sit on authorities to often consider only 
what’s best for the authority.’”).
122. See Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 18 (“The Task Force believes that the recommendation for 
removal power granted to the ABO under [the Reform Act] is a meaningful enforcement measure, and 
that the ABO should rigorously exercise it to ensure compliance.”).
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  4. Liability as a Deterrent
 Unlike private shareholders in the corporate governance model, the Reform Act 
precludes taxpaying “shareholders” from challenging negligent exercises of discretion 
by board members relegating enforcement to an underfunded, statutorily weak 
agency. While private shareholders have the potential to be made whole if a director-
defendant’s actions do not qualify for business judgment protection, citizens wronged 
by public authority board misconduct have no real remedy under the Reform Act.
 The Reform Act’s sponsor, former Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, acknowledged 
the difficulties in enforcing the fiduciary provisions. He stated that “the consequence 
of [establishing that board members may be removed for violation of fiduciary duties] 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????????? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ???? ??
fiduciary duty.”123 However, such a statement cannot be reconciled with the legislative 
intent of effecting real, meaningful change in authority governance. Merely 
“reminding” public authority board members will not truly deter misconduct; holding 
them personally liable (i.e. legal liability) will.124 Without such enforcement, the 
Reform Act becomes nothing more than an idealistic repackaging of the Public 
Authority Accountability Act.
IV. MEANINGFUL ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES MEANINGFUL CHANGE
 The Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions must be enforceable in a manner that 
will lead to positive changes in public authority governance practices. The Reform 
Act’s current framework and its reliance on the corporate governance model, while 
innovative, not only lacks the ability to deter future misconduct, but fails to provide 
redress to citizens harmed by improper board decisionmaking. An effective statute 
must have these characteristics. This section first explores proposals that could 
strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of the Reform Act and then advocates for 
solutions that can realistically achieve greater transparency and accountability in 
public authorities.125
 A. The Prospect of Citizen Enforcement
 To date, no citizen-plaintiff has alleged a violation of the fiduciary duty provisions 
of the Reform Act against a public authority board or board member. However, the 
time may soon come when the courts will see such a challenge. In fact, the pre-
123. Norman Oder, MTA Board’s Acceptance of Ratner’s Lesser Offer for Railyard Would Violate its Fiduciary 
Duty, Atlantic Yards Report (June 8, 2009), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/07/
whats-violating-fiduciary-duty-for.html (quoting Richard Brodsky, PARA’s Sponsor at the Albany Law 
School Symposium: Public Authorities Law: Maintaining the Balance (June 3, 2009)).
124. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal 
Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 393, 438–39 (2005) (discussing studies which show that “increasing the 
certainty of legal sanctions effectively deters [corporate] misconduct”).
125. See Sponsor’s Memorandum, supra note 8 (“This legislation includes many of those recommendations 
and others intended to improve public authority operations and oversight.”).
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Reform Act case Montgomery, discussed above, illustrates a situation in which the 
public may wish to hold public authority board members accountable for breached 
fiduciary duties.126 As public authorities are so pervasively involved in government, 
there is little doubt that members of the public will seek judicial review of public 
authority action.127 In these cases, authority board members, and not the authority 
itself, will likely be the defendants.
  1. The Case for Citizen Enforcement
 Because public authority board decisions affect the daily lives of taxpayers and 
their communities, citizens have a fundamental interest in preventing board 
misconduct. Like shareholders of a private corporation, they should have the authority 
to hold the board accountable for negligent and self-serving decisions that adversely 
affect their community.128 While this is not to suggest that taxpayers have the same 
risks and interests at stake as private shareholders, taxpayers should be entitled to the 
independent and careful decisionmaking of public authority board members.129 This 
is because authority board decisions can directly affect the lives of citizens. It is 
reasonable to suggest that these individuals should have a remedy for misconduct. 
Whether an authority board votes on an urban renewal plan, construction of a 
????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????130
 Citizen involvement in the enforcement of the fiduciary duty provisions of the 
Reform Act may also result in better oversight of non-compliant local public authorities. 
This is because citizens have a vested interest in the allocation of their tax dollars and 
may be more willing to judicially challenge or report evidence of misconduct than 
government officials. Although the Authorities Budget Office maintains that it will 
investigate any complaint against a public authority, it lacks the resources to effectively 
126. Montgomery v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
Dec. 15, 2009).
127. Wilson Memo, supra note 3, at 22.
It is time to return public authorities to their core mission, restore control over State-
funded authority debt to New York’s taxpayers and expose authority operations to 
systematic oversight. While public authorities provide important services and support 
for New York’s critical infrastructure, lasting reform will help the State ensure long-
term fiscal stability, affordability and transparency.
 Id.
128. See Note, Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, 105 Har. 
L. Rev. 1590, 1596 (1992) (“Like shareholders in a business corporation, nonprofit members have a 
large stake in controlling the directors’ activities because they are directly served by the organization.”).
129. Because of the infinite factual scenarios that may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, this note 
contends that the question of when authority misconduct may be litigated is for the courts to decide. A 
general principle might be that litigation is warranted when there are measurable damages.
130. The 2010 MTA fare hikes serve an example of these tangible consequences. See Michael M. Grynbaum, 
M.T.A. Approves Transit Fare Increases, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Oct. 7, 2010, 11:31 AM), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/m-t-a-meets-to-increase-transit-fares.
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accomplish this.131 The statistics representing the number of local authorities that failed 
to comply with reporting requirements support the inference that the Authorities 
Budget Office cannot enforce the Reform Act.132 In July 2010, the New York Times 
reported that “175 public authorities did not provide annual reports” and “of the annual 
reports filed, 21 percent had significant data errors.”133 The following year the 
Authorities Budget Office reported the persistence of significant data errors and poor 
compliance rates, noting “there is a continued concern that some authorities are not 
taking the time to ensure their information is accurate and complete.”134 Thus, one 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Budget Office and could better enforce the fiduciary duty provisions through judicial 
intervention. Citizens have a wealth of resources available ranging from advocacy 
groups to self-funded initiatives that the state government does not have the resources 
to provide. Further, citizens, unlike public authority board members, do not have 
similar conflicts of interest in reporting perceived misconduct.
 The alternative to citizen enforcement is the time-consuming process requiring a 
citizen to report the misconduct to the Authorities Budget Office; thereafter the 
citizen must wait for an investigation, a report, and finally a recommendation. In the 
time it takes the Authorities Budget Office to issue its findings, board members can 
continue to engage in conduct violating the Reform Act. These reasons favor giving 
taxpaying citizens a limited role in the enforcement of the fiduciary duty provisions 
of the Reform Act.
  2. The Case Against Citizen Enforcement
 While easing standing requirements to facilitate the bringing of suits by “harmed” 
community members seems like a logical and efficient way to stop misconduct, the 
costs may outweigh the benefits. In In re Abrams, the New York Court of Appeals laid 
out the case against granting citizen standing to challenge public authority decisions.135 
In finding for the MTA in a noise-related nuisance case, the court noted that “[t]o 
allow such actions would in effect attempt displacement . . . of the lawful acts of 
appointive and elective officials charged with the management of the public 
enterprises.”136 Perhaps fearing the emergence of frivolous lawsuits, the court concluded 
that “the ultimate public remedy against poor government management is at the voting 
machine. Neglect, inefficiency, and erroneous but reasonably made exercise of judgment 
131. Ceasar, supra note 6.
132. Id.
133. Id. This also supports the conclusion that the ABO lacks enforcement capability. Though the 2011 
Annual Report showed an improvement of approximately thirty-three percent from 2010, that number 
is not necessarily accurate as it ref lects reports that were identified for “re-submit status,” meaning there 
were still significant data errors in the initial filings.
134. 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29, at 11.
135. In re Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990 (1976).
136. Id. at 992.
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fall short of illegality.”137 Under this view, reform should come from elected 
representatives, not the judiciary. Broadening standing requirements to allow claims by 
citizens who have not suffered a direct injury “would disrupt government operation by 
posing the threat of litigation to challenge any governmental action.”138
 Furthermore, even if New York courts were to recognize standing more broadly, 
a plaintiff would have to convince a court that the Reform Act contains a private 
right of action, a contention that runs contrary to the legislative intent.139 The court 
in Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v Procter & Gamble Co. recognized this principle, 
finding that even if the petitioners, an environmental organization, could show 
standing in an Article 78140 proceeding, their suit could not proceed because no 
private right of action existed under the challenged statute.141 Consequently, a claim 
against a public authority board is actionable as a common law suit alleging a breach 
of fiduciary duty only after standing has been shown.142 However, given the legislative 
intent to preclude such actions, it is unlikely a court would entertain a common law 
suit claiming breach of fiduciary duty.143 To enable a private right of action, the 
legislature would need to amend the Reform Act.
 It remains to be seen whether broadening standing to allow citizen suits against 
public authority board members would in reality “open the f loodgates” to litigation 
against public authorities. Traditionally, taxpayer waste suits have not been frivolously 
brought, and there is no reason to believe that claims against public authority board 
members would be any different.144 Coupled with the high cost of litigation and 
strict pleading requirements, it is unlikely that allowing taxpayers to challenge board 
misconduct would be detrimental to public board operations.145
137. Id. at 993; see Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. N.Y. Metro. Transp. Auth., 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep’t 
2005); see also Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner 59 N.Y.2d 314, 334 (1983) (stating 
“invasions of rights common to all of the public should be left to be remedied by action by public 
officials” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C, cmt. b (1979)).
138. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 813 (2003). 
139. Legislative Memorandum, supra note 92.
140. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 2012) (An Article 78 proceeding allows a challenge to “a determination 
[that] was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty 
or discipline imposed.”).
141. Women’s Voices for the Earth, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 906 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 2010).
142. See Doe v. Cmty. Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (3d Dept. 2000) (“While a private 
cause of action may not be predicated on . . . [the statue], these statutes define and impose the scope of 
the actionable duty of confidentiality.”). Thus it could be argued that the Public Authority Accountability 
Act imposes an actionable common law claim for breach of fiduciary duty. A common law breach could 
be negligence. 
143. Id. at 217.
144. See supra note 96. 
145. See generally Robert Corn-Revere, Narrow Issue of Taxpayer Standing Highlights Wide Divisions Among the 
Justices, 2006–07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 215 (2007).
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  3. A Hybrid Solution
 While citizens should have a voice in challenging board member conduct, 
allowing them standing could theoretically disrupt public authority operations in a 
manner inconsistent with the Public Authority Accountability Act and the Reform 
Act.146 However, this does not mean the public should be completely excluded from 
enforcement. Thus a scheme allowing limited citizen participation without easing 
standing requirements would likely serve the legislative intent.
 The Authorities Budget Office should first develop a user-friendly reporting 
system that collects complaints about authority board conduct from concerned 
citizens and then responds in a reasonable period of time. Currently, the New York 
State Attorney General serves as the designated complaint forum against public 
authorities.147 The Attorney General’s website merely directs parties to fill out 
general forms, which cannot be submitted online.148 It is not clear how quickly the 
complaints are reviewed by the Attorney General’s Office and how long it takes 
before matters are investigated. However, it can be inferred that complaints against a 
public authority are somewhat delayed in reaching the Authorities Budget Office.
 It is therefore essential that the Authorities Budget Office add a “citizen’s corner” 
on its website, which explains the fiduciary duty provisions in plain English and 
provides an easy mechanism to submit questions and complaints. For example, if a 
citizen learns or suspects that a public authority board engaged in self-dealing or 
negligent conduct, he could then easily learn about the requisite fiduciary duties of the 
Reform Act and file a complaint electronically. This would allow meaningful citizen 
participation without broadening standing requirements or encouraging frivolous 
lawsuits. Additionally, this solution would lead to a more efficient and effective 
reporting system, which would be relatively easy and cost-efficient to implement.
 If these initiatives fail, the legislature should consider either amending State 
Finance Law section 123-b to allow standing without establishing injury in fact, or 
enacting new legislation to allow taxpayer suits against public authority board 
members. Although fears of opening the “f loodgates” are reasonable, it is far from 
certain whether frivolous suits will in fact be brought and whether such suits would 
be detrimental to public authority board operations. Given this often-cited concern, 
146. See Montgomery v. MTA, No. 114304/09, 2009 WL 4843782, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 15, 
2009) (finding that the delay resulting from citizens suits “would only cause uncertainty about the 
projects and likely increase both public and private expense”). This is contrary to objectives of the 
Reform Act, which called for raising “transparency standards” while maintaining “the authorities’ 
ability to promote economic development.” Press Release, supra note 4.
147. The New York State Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the Public Authority Law. See 
generally Accelerating Momentum to Achieve Reform, supra note 99 (providing examples of 
attorney general enforcement). 
148. See Filing a Consumer Complaint, Consumer Frauds Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, http://
www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/consumer_frauds/filing_a_consumer_complaint.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2012); see also Investigations Unit of the Legal Services Division, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/investigations/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
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a first step should be a government study of taxpayer waste suits in New York that 
examines their frequency and estimates hardships imposed on the state.
 B. A Stronger Authorities Budget Office
 As the Task Force acknowledged, the state should strengthen the Authorities 
Budget Office to accomplish its mission.149 This can be achieved through additional 
staff, funding, and active enforcement.150
 First, it is imperative that the Authorities Budget Office increase its staff 
significantly. Compared to other state agencies, the Authorities Budget Office is 
disproportionately small. For example, while the 2010 projected number of staff for 
the Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities was 
101 and the State Racing and Wagering Board was ninety-nine, the Authorities 
Budget Office reported only eleven.151 Additionally, the Authorities Budget Office is 
charged with overseeing more than 490 entities that affect the entire state, while the 
Commission on Quality of Care administers a “statewide network of over 30 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?? ?????????????????????????152 
As the Task Force recommends, the creation of thirty more positions is essential to 
meet the responsibilities of the Reform Act because the ABO “does not have 
sufficient staff to undertake an analysis of debt practices, study the consolidation, 
restructuring or reformation of authorities, conduct simultaneous on site reviews, or 
to focus on other issues of importance.”153
 Second, increased funding for the Authorities Budget Office is essential for 
enforcement. The Task Force found that new funding should be directed toward 
“developing the capability . . . for . . . investigating potential violations of a board’s 
fiduciary duty, executive mismanagement, or alleged acts of misconduct uncovered 
during the course of its official business.”154 Additionally, the Authorities Budget 
Office currently lacks funding to employ a deputy director for examinations and 
enforcement, as well as its own legal counsel.155 Therefore, without additional 
funding, the Authorities Budget Office will not be able to attract the competent and 
capable experts necessary to meet the Reform Act’s objectives.
 While additional funding will certainly increase the Authorities Budget Office’s 
ability to investigate and act against breaches of fiduciary duties, it will not in itself 
deter authority boards from misconduct. Given the time it takes to investigate and 
149. Task Force Report, supra note 61.
150. Id. at 19–22. Increased education and training has also been recommended, but is not discussed here.
151. Id. at 20.
152. See Strategic Plan 2008–2010, N.Y. State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for 
Persons with Disabilities, available at http://cqc.ny.gov/about/about-the-commission/strategic-plan 
(last visited Jan. 18 2012).; see also 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29.
153. Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 21.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 20–21.
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remove a board, it is unclear if a bigger, smarter, and better-funded Authorities Budget 
Office will alone influence authority board decisionmaking. This is an important 
issue because the Reform Act seeks deterrence as much as it seeks accountability.156 
As a result, it is necessary for the Authorities Budget Office to exercise, and be able to 
exercise, its powers to the fullest extent under the Reform Act.
 C. The IRS Enforcement Model of Private Foundation Governance
 The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains fiduciary duty provisions for private 
non-profit foundations that are similar to those contemplated under the Reform 
Act.157 However, unlike the Reform Act, the IRC provides a strong enforcement 
mechanism for breaches of fiduciary duties in the form of fines.158 An examination of 
the similarities between private non-profit boards and public authority boards 
suggests that the IRC model of fiduciary duty enforcement would work well when 
applied to public authorities.
 Under the IRC, private non-profit board members have a duty of care and are 
subject to a prohibition on self-dealing.159 Congress sought to “prevent abuses by certain 
privately controlled charitable entities” such as use of “such assets by the foundations to 
accumulate income . . . to invest in overly risky ventures, to engage in self-dealing 
transactions . . . or to promote political or other noncharitable objectives.”160 These 
regulatory governance goals echo the legislative intent of the Reform Act. Like the 
Authorities Budget Office, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initially had difficulty 
156. This is evidenced by the emphasis on training as well as the acknowledgment of the fiduciary duties. 
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2824(2) (McKinney 2011).
Individuals appointed to the board of a public authority shall participate in state 
approved training regarding their legal, fiduciary, financial and ethical responsibilities 
as directors of an authority within one year of appointment to a board. Board members 
shall participate in such continuing training as may be required to remain informed of 
best practices, regulatory and statutory changes relating to the effective oversight of the 
management and financial activities of public authorities and to adhere to the highest 
standards of responsible governance.
 Id.
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944 (2006) (imposing taxes on a private foundation and, in certain cases, its 
management, for making investments that “ jeopardize the carrying out of any of [the foundation’s] 
exempt purposes”); 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 4941. 
159. Id.
[T]here is hereby imposed on the participation of any foundation manager in an act of 
self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation, knowing that it is 
such an act, a tax equal to 5 percent of the amount involved with respect to the act of self-
dealing for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period, unless such participation is 
not willful and is due to reasonable cause. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be 
paid by any foundation manager who participated in the act of self-dealing.
 Id.
160. Hammond v. U.S., 764 F.2d 88, 88 (2d Cir. 1985); see also 26 U.S.C. § 508 (2006).
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enforcing the fiduciary duty provisions applicable to foundation managers; it also 
lacked the resources and remedies to ensure compliance.161
 In contemplating a mechanism for the enforcement of fiduciary duty provisions 
on all non-profit corporation boards, a Harvard Law Review article posits that “a 
relaxation of standing requirements is unlikely to enhance the enforcement of 
fiduciary duties.”162 The article suggests that a better approach would be to “increase 
deterrence by enhancing the punishment for fiduciary duty violations rather than by 
increasing the chance that a breaching director will be caught.”163 The article 
concludes by proposing a remedy modeled on the IRC, which fines directors of 
private foundations for self-dealing.164
 Under this self-dealing statute, the IRS may impose “a tax on each act of self-
dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation.”165 Additionally, if 
corrective action is not taken, the IRS can levy a tax equal to fifty percent of the 
amount involved, and all board members can be held jointly and severally liable.166 
The organization itself is not penalized.167 While the IRC does not explicitly 
prescribe a duty of care, a board will be sanctioned for making investment decisions 
that “ jeopardize [its] charitable purpose.”168 Officers who are found in violation of 
this section are subject to “a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount . . . unless such 
participation is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”169
 In essence, the IRC aims to deter self-dealing and breaches of the duty of care by 
private non-profit board members through the threat of additional taxes.170 The IRC 
161. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128, at 
1600.
162. Id. at 1607.
163. Id. 
164. Id.
165. 26 U.S.C. § 4941. The word “disqualified” is defined under section 4946. For the purpose of this note, 
we will assume a public authority board member with a conf lict of interest would fall under this 
category. For example, if a public authority board member had a substantial investment in a corporation, 
he would be prohibited from voting to give a valuable contract to that corporation.
166. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
167. John A. Edie, Forum of Regional Assocs. of Grantmakers, Self Dealing: A Concise Guide 
For Foundation Board and Staff (2008), http://www.cof.org/f iles/Documents/Family_
Foundations/Legal-and-Tax-Issues/Self-Dealing-Guide-for-Foundation-Board-and-Staff.pdf.
168. 26 U.S.C. § 4944.
169. Id.
170. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128, 
at 1607–08.
Assume that D, a director of a public benefit nonprofit corporation and sole owner of a 
bank, arranges for the corporation to obtain a loan from his bank. Interest on the loan 
has a present value equal to $100 more than loans available at other banks. In other 
words, D is willing to sacrifice $100 of the corporation’s assets to increase his bank’s 
profits by $100 . . . . If D is a risk neutral individual who is indifferent to the means by 
which he makes a profit . . . he will engage in the prohibited transaction described 
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model has been effective because the harsh financial consequences present a strong 
incentive for board members to act in the best interest of their organization.171 The 
small number of enforcement actions highlights this model’s effectiveness.172
 Adapting the IRC model to the public authorities law would allow for 
substantially better enforcement of the Reform Act’s fiduciary duty provisions.173 
While the Authorities Budget Office does not currently have the power to fine, it 
does have the general power to discipline public authorities.174 Even though the 
Authorities Budget Office does not explicitly possess the statutory power to fine 
delinquent authority boards and their members, a court may interpret the statute, 
based on the legislative intent, to infer that the Authorities Budget Office has 
permissible fining capabilities. Pursuant to Title II, Section 6 of the Reform Act, the 
Authorities Budget Office may institute a judicial proceeding to obtain requested 
documentation of non-compliant public authorities.175 If courts decline to recognize 
the Authorities Budget Office’s power to fine, the legislature should amend the 
Reform Act by specifically including such a provision allowing it.
 The rationale for imposing fines on authority board directors is analogous to that 
of the IRS imposed fines on private non-profit foundation boards through additional 
taxes. First, the Authorities Budget Office, like the IRS, has limited resources to 
monitor a board’s compliance with fiduciary duties.176 Second, fine proceeds 
above as long as the expected gain from the transaction is positive. . . . If the penalty for 
self-dealing is set so that D simply returns any improperly obtained profits to the 
corporation, D will choose to breach his fiduciary duty as long as the probability of 
being caught is less than 100%. . . . Although D would not be deterred by a relaxation 
of the standing requirements, D would be effectively deterred by an increase in the penalty 
for the violation of fiduciary duties. Assuming that D will be caught 50% of the time, a 
penalty equal to twice the amount of D’s improper profit ($200) will deter D from 
engaging in the activity altogether. With a penalty of $200, D’s expected gain from the 
transaction equals zero, and D has no incentive to breach the duty of loyalty.
 Id. (emphasis added).
171. See Adams v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 373, 384 (1978) (after determining that petitioner “engaged in acts of 
self-dealing,” the court considered “whether the initial 5-percent excise tax imposed by section 4941(a) is 
applicable”).
172. See 2010 ABO Report, supra note 7; 2011 ABO Report, supra note 29 (the relevant information is 
located under the “Enforcement” sub-heading). See generally Developments in the Law-Nonprofit 
Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128.
173. Self-dealing falls under the “duty of loyalty.” See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra 
note 128, at 1603.
174. See New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform Report, supra note 13, at 9 
(“Where the ABO has formally found an authority to be in material non-compliance or otherwise at 
fault, the ABO should be authorized to impose disciplinary measures ranging from formal warnings, to 
public censure, or to recommend . . . suspension or dismissal of officers or directors.”).
175. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 6 (McKinney 2011). The ABO may “commence a special proceeding in 
supreme court, when it does not receive from a state or local authority upon request information, books, 
records or other documentation necessary to perform its duties.” Id. (emphasis added).
176. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128, 
at 1599–1600.
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compensate those who have suffered harm as a consequence of board decisionmaking. 
“Removal” is largely a symbolic disciplinary measure, it cannot tangibly compensate 
those harmed for the losses incurred. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fines 
are an efficient deterrent “[b]ecause it is less expensive to increase a fine than to 
increase the level of enforcement, the optimal level of undeterred breaches will be 
lower when fines are levied on breaching directors.”177 What is less clear in imposing 
fines under the Reform Act is who will be fined, what an appropriate fine will be, 
and who will benefit from the fine. To answer these questions, the following sections 
revisit the urban redevelopment hypothetical discussed in Part II and explore the 
application of the IRC’s self-dealing provisions to public authority boards.
  1. Who will be fined?
 In the hypothetical, a public authority board sold public land to a private 
developer in bad faith. Under the IRS model of fiduciary duty enforcement, fines 
may be levied on foundation managers (the board) who self-deal with a “disqualified 
person.”178 Here, the developer would fall under this category because he is a 
“substantial contributor” to the foundation.179 The transaction would be considered 
self-dealing because the board gets improper benefits by appeasing the Mayor. Thus, 
after an investigation, the Authorities Budget Office or Attorney General would be 
able to impose fines on the board for breaching their duty of loyalty by acting out of 
political pressure rather than pursuant to their fiduciary duties.
  2. What is an appropriate fine?
 Determining the “right” financial penalty is a difficult task because a fiduciary 
duty, alone, does not have a value. How does one compute the value of loyalty? The 
177. Id. at 1609.
178. 26 U.S.C. § 4941 (2012).
For purposes of this subchapter, the term “disqualified person” means, with respect to a 
???????? ????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????????
(B) a foundation manager (within the meaning of subsection (b)(1)), (C) an owner of 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
profits interest of a partnership, or (iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated 
enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation . . . .
 26 U.S.C. § 4946(a).
179. 26 U.S.C. § 4946; 26 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). For purposes of this analysis, the term “foundation” should 
be construed to include the current political regime or those making the decisions. A “substantial 
contributor” refers to
any person who contributed or bequeathed an aggregate amount of more than $5,000 to 
the private foundation, if such amount is more than 2 percent of the total contributions 
and bequests received by the foundation before the close of the taxable year of the 
foundation in which the contribution or bequest is received by the foundation from such 
person. In the case of a trust, the term “substantial contributor” also means the creator 
of the trust.
 26 U.S.C. § 507(d)(2)(A). 
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answer is quite subjective and will vary.180 Fines too low would not deter the conduct at 
issue, while excessive fines might prevent members from serving on boards or engaging 
in “good” self-dealing transactions that would benefit the authority and the public at 
large.181 Therefore, the logical approach is to calculate the damages resulting from the 
breach, which is precisely what the IRC prescribes.182 Under the statute, “a tax equal to 
5 percent of the amount involved with respect to the act of self-dealing for each year (or 
part thereof) in the taxable period” is imposed on the foundation manager.183
 In the hypothetical scenario, the board sold land for $250,000 below fair market 
value. Applying the IRC penalty, each board member who breached his duty of 
loyalty by accepting the lower bid in bad faith would initially be fined $12,500. 
Although this figure does not compensate for $250,000 in damages, the IRC statute 
contemplates that the non-profit’s board would take remedial measures.184 
Furthermore, under the IRS self-dealing statute, “if a foundation manager refused to 
agree to part or all of the correction, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 50 percent 
of the amount involved” which is to be paid by the foundation manager.185 Therefore, 
??????????? ???????????????????????? ????????? ????????? ?????????????? ????????????
sum likely to deter misconduct.
 Critics of this proportional system of fines may assert that this will not deter 
breaches of fiduciary duty as public authority board members are indemnified by 
statute. Pursuant to Public Officers Law section 18, officers of public authorities are 
indemnified for any judgment or settlement claim against them, provided they acted 
within the scope of their duties.186 However, as the Third Department noted in 
Wyman v. Zeltins, “[t]he statute . . . is optional and only applies if adopted by a local 
180. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 557, 565 
(1999). Under the IRC, “[t]he determination of whether compensation is reasonable and whether the 
decision to give it was adequately considered is determined on the basis of all of the facts and 
circumstances.” Id.
181. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra note 128, 
at 1610.
182. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
183. Id.
184. See Adams v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 81 (1979) (“[T]he clear intent of Congress ref lected in the language of 
section 4941(b)(1) and in the accompanying legislative history, is to condition a self-dealer’s liability for 
the second-level tax upon his failure to undertake corrective action within the correction period.”).
185. 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
186. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 18 (McKinney 2011).
The public entity shall indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any 
judgment obtained against such employees in a state or federal court, or in the amount 
of any settlement of a claim, provided that the act or omission from which such 
judgment or claim arose occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his 
public employment or duties; provided further that in the case of a settlement the duty 
to indemnify and save harmless shall be conditioned upon the approval of the amount 
of settlement by the governing body of the public entity.
 Id.
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governing body.”187 In fact, most authorities will indemnify their officers unless there 
is a breach of fiduciary duty. For example, the MTA’s bylaws provide indemnification 
“unless such individual is determined by the Authority or its designee not to have 
acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he or she reasonably believed to be in the 
best interests of the Authority or of its subsidiaries or affiliates.”188
 Even if there is no indemnification for breach of fiduciary duty, there is still a 
question of whether the board member “act[ed] within the scope of his public 
employment or duties.”189 Because public authorities will usually not indemnify board 
members who have acted in bad faith, the imposition of fines remains an effective 
deterrent.
  3. Redressabilitly
 The IRC model properly compensates societal “harm” caused by private non-
profit foundation board misconduct through redistribution.190 Since damages 
awarded to plaintiffs might be an incentive to bring frivolous lawsuits, a better 
alternative would be to direct the revenue generated by the fine to the Authorities 
Budget Office. The Authorities Budget Office could use a percentage of the money 
to take corrective measures relating the misconduct, and then fund its operating 
expenses. This would give the Authorities Budget Office the necessary resources to 
provide active enforcement and would also compensate taxpayers who have taken on 
the burden of policing authority board misconduct. In the hypothetical, for example, 
if the $125,000 fine had been collected by the Authorities Budget Office, the money 
could go back to the locality and be indirectly distributed to those affected citizens 
pursuant to an approved formula.191
 Although it is clear that public authorities are different from non-profit 
corporations in mission and function, both entities suffer from what Professor 
??????? ??????????? ???? ??????? ?? ????????????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????????
“generally operate under the same state fiduciary standards as their for-profit peers, 
but, in contrast to the for-profit world, fiduciary law plays little role in assuring 
accountability in the nonprofit sector.”192 Therefore, the IRC model of imposing 
fines for breaches of fiduciary duties could be a valuable and meaningful step in 
“reining in” New York public authorities.193
187. 531 N.Y.S.2d 144, 144 (3d Dep’t 1988).
188. Metro. Transp. Auth., Metropolitan Transportation Authority Governance Principles 
and By-Laws 6 (2010) (emphasis added), http://www.mta.info/mta/compliance/pdf/2010_annual/
GovernancePrinciplesandBy-Laws.pdf.
189. See Pub. Off. § 18.
190. See generally Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: II. The Fiduciary Duties of Directors, supra 
note 128.
191. This note does not prescribe a formula for distributing the fines collected.
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193. See generally Reining in New York’s Secret Government, supra note 12.
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V. CONCLUSION
 After the passage of the Reform Act, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky declared, 
“Today, we return to the control of the people of the state their most powerful 
institutions.”194 Governor Paterson echoed these sentiments: “[f]or too long, public 
authorities have operated in the dark, under little or no public scrutiny. By signing 
this bill into law today, we are turning those lights on.”195 While New York’s elected 
officials have spoken about returning public authorities to the people and “turning 
the lights on,” the Reform Act does little more than the Public Authority 
Accountability Act to bring public authorities out of the dark. Reform efforts must 
be more than bold proclamations and metaphors; they must work.
 The fiduciary duty provisions of the Reform Act were incorporated to ensure 
that the actions and decisions of public authority boards are in the public’s best 
interest. While the amended law is an essential first step to achieving accountability, 
as the Task Force recognized, active enforcement continues to be difficult to achieve. 
Under the current law, the Authorities Budget Office lacks the power and the 
resources to ensure that board members are complying with their duties of care and 
loyalty. For positive change, the Authorities Budget Office must have adequate 
enforcement capabilities.
 The new fiduciary duty provisions are not only important in a political sense, but 
also in a legal sense. The drafters of the Reform Act adopted the corporate model of 
board governance, but improperly cut the essential remedial measures that are central 
to achieving its purpose. The remedies available to shareholders of private and non-
profit corporations must carry over to public authority law. Without them, public 
authority boards will continue to act in the dark without accountability. Real reform 
requires a better system, and the imposition of fines on authority boards is just that. 
 A system of fines for board misconduct, coupled with a limited role for citizen 
lawsuits and a better funded and staffed Authorities Budget Office, emerges as a 
realistic and efficient model that will compensate the public and deter improper actions. 
Such a system is cost effective and can be implemented quickly. But most importantly 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?? ???????????????????????????????????????
in the interest of the people they serve, and the active enforcement of the newly enacted 
fiduciary duties is a crucial first step. It’s time to turn the lights on.
194. Confessore, supra note 105.
195. See Press Release, supra note 4.
